地方政府在企业超标排污监管中的博弈分析及对策研究

A Game Analysis and Countermeasure Research on the Supervision of Local Governments over Enterprises those Discharge Pollutants Incompliantly

探讨了2个同级地方政府在企业超标排污监管中的非合作博弈,发现当前地方政府绩效考核体系重视经济发展,因此存在对环保宽松监管以换取当地经济发展的现象,造成生境恶化。提出建立环保监管升级制度和环境保护税设为共享税的对策,使地方政府因支付成本过高而放弃宽松监管策略,从而实现企业超标排污监管的长效治理,加快企业转型升级。

A non-cooperative game between two local governments at the same level was discussed on their supervision over enterprises’ incompliant pollutant discharges. It was found that at present the governmental performance appraisal system attached importance to economic development, resulting in taking loose environmental regulation to get local economic development in return so as to cause the biotope deteriorated. Countermeasures to build a system of upgrading environmental supervision and to set the environmental tax as a shared one were proposed. It could promote the local governments to give up the loose regulation caused by too high defrayment, so that the long-term solution could be achieved to control the incompliant pollutant discharges, and the transformation and upgrading of enterprises could be expedited.