摘要
在梳理现有流域生态补偿标准核算方法的基础上,运用鲁宾斯坦恩-斯塔尔讨价还价模型,构建了有限期博弈和无限期博弈的跨省水源地保护生态补偿标准讨价还价博弈模型;并以于桥水库为例,按照不同补偿区域分析了天津市对河北省的生态补偿标准,探讨了出价次序变化和贴现因子变化对补偿标准的影响。结果表明:以于桥水库流域、潘家口-大黑汀水库及引滦入津沿线区域、和主要水源区承德市为补偿对象的生态补偿标准分别在1.67~15.96亿元、0.30~11.49亿元和8.49~85.37亿元之间。影响因子分析显示,在有限期讨价还价博弈中,跨省水源地保护生态补偿标准与贴现因子δ的大小、博弈时期T的长短及谁在最后出价有关;在无限期讨价还价博弈中,跨省水源地保护生态补偿标准与贴现因子δ的大小以及谁最先出价有关。
In this paper, we established a bargaining model of eco-compensation standards for inter-provincial water source protection under finite and infinite bargaining conditions by applying the Rubinstein & Stahl bargaining model after analyzing the problems in the existing basin eco-eompensation calculation methods. The established model was applied to the Yuqiao Reservoir to analyze the eco-compensation standards of Tianjin Municipality for Hebei Province in terms of compensation regions. We discussed the impacts of bidding order variation and discount factor variation on the compensation standards. The results showed that the eeo-compensation standards for Yuqiao Reservoir basin, the region around Panjiakou-Daheiting reservoirs and along Luanhe-Tian)in water transfer project, and the main water source region Chengde City were respectively between 167 to 1 596 mil- lion RMB,30 to i 149 million RMB,and 849 to 8 537 million RMB. The impact factor analysis demonstrated that,in the finite bargaining, the inter-provincial eco-eompensation standard was related to the discount factor, the duration of the biding stage T, and the last bidder; in the infinite bargaining, the standard was related to the discount factor and the first bidder.
出处
《南水北调与水利科技》
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期88-95,共8页
South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science & Technology
基金
中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)
特色发展引导专项资金资助~~
关键词
跨省水源地保护
生态补偿标准
讨价还价博弈
于桥水库
inter-provincial water source protection
eco-compensation standard
bargaining
Yuq[ao Reservoir