失地农民维权行为的演化博弈分析

Analysis of Land-lost Peasant Right Protection Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game

失地农民是城镇化进程中的产物,若农民被征用土地而不能得到正当补偿就可能诱发其维权行为,这是我国城镇化进程中面临的突出社会问题,针对此问题,运用演化博弈论建立失地农民群体间的博弈模型,分析失地农民维权行为发生的内在原因和演化规律;研究发现:失地农民维权行为具有较强的学习与模仿等有限理性特征,预期征地补偿是失地农民选择维权的基本动力;失地农民对未来生活越是担忧越可能选择维权,较高的维权难度和较大的失地农民群体规模是抑制失地农民维权行为的两个重要因素;研究结论对于理解失地农民的维权行为并据此制定相应政策均有一定启示意义。

The land-lost peasants are the product in the process of urbanization,if peasants ＇ land is expropriated but can not get proper compensation,the peasants＇ right protection behavior will possibly be trigged,which is typically social problem in the process of urbanization. Based on this,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to set up the game model among the land-lost peasant groups and analyzes internal cause and evolutionary law for the right protection behavior of the land-lost peasants. The research finds that the right protection behavior of the land-lost peasants has limited rational characteristics such as relatively strongly learning and imitating and so on,that expected land expropriation compensation is the basic power for the land-lost peasant to choose their right protection behavior,that the more the land-lost peasants concern about their future,the more possibly they choose their right protection behavior,and that the higher right protection difficulty and the bigger land-lost peasants scale are the two important factors for the land-lost peasants to choose right protection behavior. The research conclusion has certain inspiration significance to both the understanding of the right protection behavior of the land-lost peasants and making the related policies accordingly.