高管薪酬差距、公司成长性水平与创新投入

Executives Compensation Gap,Company's Growth level and Innovation Investment

本文选取2012-2015年创业板上市公司的数据为样本,基于锦标赛理论、行为理论及企业生命周期理论,考察了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业创新投入的影响。研究表明,在全样本下,创业板上市公司高管团队内部薪酬差距与创新投入水平显著负相关。此外,本文利用成长性指数进一步对我国的创业板上市公司的样本进行分组研究发现,高成长性公司样本与低成长性公司样本中高管薪酬差距对创新投入的影响存在一定的差异:具体来讲,高成长性公司样本中高管薪酬差距与创新投入之间的负相关关系会进一步增强,而在低成长性公司样本中高管薪酬差距反而有利于企业的创新投入。

Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2012-2015 in GEM, based on the tournament theory, behavior theory and the enterprise life cycle theory, this paper examines the relationship between executives' pay gap and enterprise innovation investment. The empirical result shows that a significantly negative correlation between the GEM listed companies executives' pay gap and innovation investment level based on full sample. In addition, using the growth index of company to divide the full sample into two groups: high-growth samples and low-growth samples, further study has proved that executives' pay gap have different effect on innovation investment between high-growth samples and low-growth samples. Specifically, the negative correlation between executives pay gap and innovation input in high-growth company sample will be further enhanced, while in the sample of low-growth companies,executive pay gap is conducive to the innovation investment of enterprises.