资本流动还是信息不对称——对中国地方政府税收竞争动因的实证研究

Capital Mobility or Information Asymmetry:An Empirical Study of Motivations of Tax Competition in China

理论上,地区间税收竞争行为可能基于资本流动与信息不对称两种动因产生。基于1999—2014年省级面板数据,采用系统GMM方法对中国地区宏观财政收入与各主要税种及费类收入竞争行为的性质与动因进行实证检验。结果表明:总体上,中国地区间存在显著且稳健的税收模仿行为;与居民生活密切相关的消费税表现出信息不对称下的税收标尺竞争;对于与资本要素密切相关的增值税、企业所得税与城镇土地使用税,资本的跨地区流动是解释其地区间策略互动关系的最好方式;营业税、个人所得税与行政事业性收费不具有显著的空间策略互动特征。

Tw o mechanisms,capital mobility and information asymmetry,can theoretically lead to strategic interaction of tax policies across provinces. This paper tests the nature and motivations of competition in overall revenue and each major category of taxes on China＇ s provincial panel data from 1999 to2014. The results indicate that there exists significant and positive spatial tax competition. Consumption tax w hich highly related to the living is involved in an information-led tax competition,w hile in the case of value-added tax,enterprise income tax,and urban land use tax w hich is closely related to capital and the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best w ay to explain tax competition. Business tax,personal income tax and administrative fees don＇t have significant strategic interactions.