异地上市公司的政治资源获取:基于聘请北京独立董事的考察

Chasing Political Resources by Listed Companies: A Perspective on Hiring Non-local Independent Directors from Beijing

以沪、深两市2002年至2013年A股主板上市公司为样本,本文对异地上市公司聘请北京独立董事的动机与经济后果进行了探讨。研究显示:(1)出于获取政治资源的动机,总部与北京距离较远以及总部所在地制度环境较差的上市公司更倾向于聘请北京异地独立董事;(2)相比较北京当地上市公司,异地上市公司聘请的北京独立董事中任职于政府部门的比例显著更高;(3)聘请北京独立董事的确有助于异地上市公司的政治资源获取,表现为有助于企业股权再融资、进入高壁垒行业以及降低企业违规处罚风险。同时,北京异地独立董事也获取了更高的薪酬。本文研究进一步厘清了我国背景下独立董事聘任决策与其职能发挥间的内在机理,显示了转轨经济背景下独立董事制度可能存在的功能异化,对公司治理机制的完善具有重要意义。

Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2002 to 2013,we investigate the motivation and consequences of listed companies hiring non-local independent directors from Beijing. The results indicate that:( 1) Listed companies that are headquartered far away from Beijing,or located in poor institutional environments,are more inclined to hire non-local independent directors from Beijing for the sake of political resources;( 2) Listed companies not headquartered in Beijing hire a significantly higher ratio of independent directors with full-time jobs in Beijing that are retired government officials than listed companies located in Beijing;( 3) Appointing independent directors from Beijing helps enterprises to refinance equity,enter high-barrier industries,and reduce the risk of illegal penalties. Our analysis also reveals that non-local independent directors from Beijing receive higher remuneration.This study clarifies the internal decision mechanisms surrounding independent director appointments and the role they play. Our results reflect the functional dissimilation of the independent director system as an enforceable institution under a transitional economy and provide important implications to improve our corporate governance mechanisms.