新股发行速度裁量与公司盈余管理——基于首次公开发行股票公司视角的考察

The Discretion on Speed of IPO and Corporate Earnings Management:Evidence from the IPO Firms

中国A股新股发行速度受到证券监管部门的控制,属于证券管制部门裁量事项。本文使用2006-2015年的数据,对首次公开发行股票公司的盈余管理行为是否受到股票发行速度这一行政裁量事项影响的命题进行了研究。研究结论表明,拟上市公司的盈余管理水平与新股发行速度呈负相关,上述特征显著存在于拟上市公司的真实盈余管理行为中,而未发现显著存在于应计盈余管理行为;同时,盈利增长和持续性差的公司,上述盈余管理倾向更明显,上市后业绩也更容易发生下滑。本文结论有助于进一步理解首次公开发行股票公司的盈余管理行为,也有助于深入认识行政裁量与公司行为的关系,对丰富公司治理理论和加强证券监管实务具有积极作用。

The issue tempo of Chinese A-share companies is mainly decided by CSRC and is part of discretionary events. We use the sample from 2006 to 2015 to investigate the influence of dis-cretionary new issue on IPO firms＇ earnings management （EM）. Our findings support that the lower issue tempo is relevant to greater EM, which association significantly exists in the real EM but not in the accrual EM. Further, companies whose earnings persistence are worse are more likely to manage earnings and experience performance decline after IPOs. The conclusion helps us understand the EM among IPO firms and the relation between administrative discretion and firms＇ behavior, and con- tributes to corporate governance literature and security regulations.