国企改革背景下母子公司债务责任问题的规制逻辑和进路

Regulatory Logic and Approach to the Liability of Parent Company for the Debt of Subsidiary Company Against the Background of China's Reform of State-Owned Enterprises

在我国启动新一轮国企改革的背景下,公司集团中母子公司债务责任问题的规制日益急迫,但我国目前对此没有专门的规定,解决进路主要是依赖一般性的公司法人格否认制度,但该制度在现实中的适用尚存不少问题,相关研究也非常有限。从法经济学的视角看,公司集团本质上是一个介于市场与企业之间的中间组织,有利于降低交易成本和市场风险,提高资源配置效率。由于公司集团兼具市场与组织的二元特征,其管控结构呈现层级化和网络化的分野,进而导致英美法系和以德国为代表的大陆法系对于母子公司债务责任问题采取不同的法律规则范式。国外相关立法除了理论范式差异之外,其具体实施情况也非常值得关注。在国外经验的本土化移植过程中,建议我国采用一个以英美法系的分离实体范式为主、德国的单一企业范式为辅的新范式,即在引入英美法系公司法人格否认制度的基础上,批判性地吸收德国康采恩制度的有益成分,建立一个涵括一般适用规则、特殊适用规则和自由契约机制的母子公司债务责任体系。

China does not have special rules governing parent responsibility for the debt of subsidiary companies, and relies on the general regime of piercing the corporate veil. There are problems with the application of the veil--piercing regime in practice while relevant academic studies are limited on the is- sue. The objective of this paper is thus to fill the research lacuna, conducting a focused study on the piercing regime in the corporate group situation. Based on the law and economics analytical framework, it compares the experiences of common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions, and then with reference to the local conditions in China, put forwards policy suggestions for China. It is submitted that China should adopt a mixed approach, with the entity law approach of common law jurisdictions as the main ba- sis, supplemented by the enterprise law approach as embodied in the German Konzern regime. More spe- cifically, drawing upon international experiences, China＇s regime for the liability of corporate groups should consist of a number of elements, including general rules, special rules and contractual arrange- ments.