摘要
本文从CEO自主权理论视角出发,选取2010—2015年371家制造业国有上市公司为研究对象,探讨上市国有企业CEO自主权对高管—员工薪酬差距的影响效应及动机。理论分析与实证数据表明,国有企业CEO自主权与高管—员工薪酬差距存在显著正相关关系,并通过验证国有企业CEO—员工自主权差距对高管—员工薪酬差距的影响证实CEO自主权出于利企性动机在合理范围内正向影响高管—员工薪酬差距。研究结论为国有企业CEO自主权配置、薪酬政策制定提供相应思路,发展了CEO自主权和高管薪酬的研究内容,为完善国有企业公司治理,优化国有企业CEO自主权配置和薪酬安排提供了相应思路。
From the perspective of CEO autonomy theory, this paper does empirical research to explore the effect and motivation of listed state-owned enterprises＇ CEO autonomy on executive-employee pay gap, then provide corresponding ideas for the formulation of CEO autonomy and remuneration policy. By taking 3620 firm-year data of the Chinese listed manufacturing enterprises as the research sample. The paper finds the following conclusion： （1） There is a significant positive correlation between state-owned enterprises＂ CEO autonomy and executive-employee pay gap. （2）CEO-employee autonomy gap is weakly related to executive-employee pay gap. The all above empirical results show that the state-owned enterprises＇ CEO autonomy positively affect executive-employee pay gap out of the firm＇s motivation.This study develops the content of CEO autonomy and executive compensation, enriches the existing research on the executive-employee salary gap of state-owned enterprises, and provides the corresponding ideas for perfecting the corporate governance and optimizing the autonomy allocation and remuneration of state- owned enterprises.
出处
《未来与发展》
2017年第12期107-115,共9页
Future and Development
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"经理自主权理论视角下国有企业内部薪酬鸿沟的形成机理及对策研究"(15BGL109)
