基于产品二元价值结构的IT产品研发项目外包关系契约研究

Research on the Relational Contract of IT Product R&D Project Outsourcing Based on the Theory of Dualistic Value Structure

IT产品的研发环节以项目的形式外包,对于合作过程中长期的合作关系研究,本文分多个阶段进行博弈分析,运用委托代理模型,基于产品的二元价值结构理论,研究发接包企业双方针对基本价值功能目标与超越价值功能目标的关系契约,并进行了仿真分析。研究发现在长期研发外包合作中,若发包企业出现违约情况,那么双方缔结的关于超越价值功能目标的关系契约将不能继续维持;发包企业违约的可能性随着贴现率的增加而增加,当发包企业从超越价值功能目标中获得的收益足够大,那么违约的可能性会变小;二元价值目标权重与发包企业的总收益正相关,发包企业应权衡两种价值,并有针对性的调节激励强度;发包企业一期违约,在以后各期只能通过增加基本价值功能目标的激励强度来提高项目总收益。研究既丰富了委托代理理论,又对IT产品研发外包实践具有一定的启示意义。

Based on the theory of product dualistic value structure, we discuss the relational contract on the long-term cooperation rela- tion of the IT product R＆D project outsourcing between the contract-awarding party and the contractor who aim at the basic value function goals and the transcend value function goals, using the principal-agent theory and multi stage game method, and finish a simulation anal- ysis. We find that if the contract-awarding party defaults, then the relational contract about transcend value function goals will not be able to continue. The possibility of breaking relational contract will be increased with the discount rate. When the contract-awarding party ob- tains enough benefits from the transcend value function goals, then the possibility of default will be small. The total revenue of enterprise from dualistic value goals has a positive correlation with objective weight. The contract-awarding party should weigh the two kinds of val- ue, and regulate the incentive intensity as needed. If the contract-awarding party defaults in the first stage, then in the later stages, it can only increase total revenue by incentive intensity of the basic value goals. The study not only enriches the theory of principal-agent theory, but also has some implications for the practice of IT product R ＆ D outsourcing.