地方政府融资平台债务审计质量控制的策略研究

Study on Controlling Strategy of Audit Quality about Local Government Financing Platform Debt

近年来审计署和银监会多次对地方政府融资平台进行了风险预警和提示,其风险监管功能的强弱取决于审计质量的高低。基于欧洲发达国家政府债务审计的成功经验,通过构建融资平台公司、会计师事务所和审计监管机构三方博弈模型,分析抑制审查合谋的审计策略;并运用期望效用理论,分析得出在节约审计成本、保持一定监管强度的基础上,提高合谋惩罚金额将更有效地抑制合谋行为的发生。最后,提出地方政府融资平台债务审计质量控制的政策组合。

Recently, local government financing platforms have been warned and prompted by Audit Commission and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the audit function of the strength of governance depends on the level of audit quality. Based on the successful experience of government debt audit in Europe, by building tripartite game of financing platform companies, accounting firms and audit regulators that analyze the audit strategy to inhibit review collusion; employing expected utility theory, the paper analyze the results that based on saving audit cost, maintaining a certain regulation strength, inhibition of collusive behavior will be more effective through improving punish amount. Then it puts forward policy package on controlling audit quality of local government financing platform debt.