哲学与科学的短路——德雷福斯人工智能批判的局限

The Shortcut Between Philosophy and Science, The Limitations of Dreyfus's Critique of AI

美国哲学家德雷福斯对人工智能的批判是现象学和技术哲学中的经典案例。他所动用的现象学资源包括胡塞尔的意向性和"生活世界"、海德格尔的"在世"、梅洛—庞蒂的知觉和身体理论。从斯洛文尼亚哲学家齐泽克的视角来看,德雷福斯的"海德格尔式的认知主义"是典型的对现象学的"美国式挪用",而他将哲学化约为科学造成了哲学与科学的"短路",从而错失了现象学(或哲学)的超越论的维度。

American philosopher Hebert Dreyfus' s critique of artificial intelligence is a classical case study in phenomenology and philosophy of technology. His phenomenology includes Husserl's" intentionality"and" life-world",Heidegger's" being-in-the-world",Merleau-Ponty's" perception" and" body". From the perceptive of Slavoj Zizek,Dreyfus' s Heideggerian cognitivism is the typical American appropriation of phenomenology,and his reduction of philosophy to science is the shortcut between philosophy and science which misses the transcendental level.