中国地方官员与区域经济发展研究

Local Officials' Conduct and Regional Economic Growth in Transitional China

对中国经济"增长奇迹"驱动因素的既有探讨,经历了从强调制度安排到聚焦地方官员的演变。对地方官员的研究,又兼及静态特征和动态过程。本文基于高阶理论,致力于从多学科视角,系统梳理地方官员与辖区经济增长的关系,以及影响二者关系的制度因素。在静态层面,分析了地方官员的专业禀赋、年龄和任期、人格特征、个人品德和行政价值观等五方面的前因。在动态层面,展示了地方官员的来源、去向、交流、更替、晋升竞争、腐败行为等六方面的效应。之后,从激励机制着手,分析了影响地方官员发挥作用的因素并提出了未来研究方向。

Previous studies on the driven forces of miracle of China＇ s economic growth has experienced a transformation from perspective of institution to that of local officials. Moreover, the studies on local officials include static characteristics and dynamic mechanism. Based on Upper Echelons Theory, we aim to systematically review the relationship between local officials and regional economic growth, and institutional factors which may affect such relationship, from perspective of multi-discipline. Specifically, we firstly analyzed static factors including professional skills, age and tenure, personality, personal morality, and administrative values. Following that, we illustrated local officials＇ origination, destination, exchange, turnover, political promotion mechanism, and corruption behaviors. After that, we explored those factors which affected the influences of local officials on regional economic growth. Finally,future directions of research and reform were proposed.