绿色信贷视角下建立绿色供应链的博弈研究

The game study of establishing green supply chain from the perspective of green credit

绿色信贷和绿色供应链是银行与企业应对生态环境日益恶劣的重要举措,政府部门的监管与引导更是绿色信贷和绿色供应链得以顺利实施的前提.本文基于政府对银行与企业同时进行奖惩,通过建立政府、银行以及企业之间的三方非对称演化博弈模型,分析了三方参与主体的演化稳定策略.研究结果表明:无论政府选择何种策略,银行和企业总有一方会选择"不实施"绿色信贷或"不采取"绿色供应链策略;从短期的角度来看,无论政府选择何种策略,银行和企业都会选择"不实施"和"不采取"策略;从长远的角度来看,在没有政府监管的情况下,银行和企业会主动选择"实施"与"采取"策略.

Green credit and green supply chain are significant measures for banks and enterprises to deal with the increasingly serious ecological environment. Supervision and guidance by governments are the prerequisites to the smooth implementation of green credit and green supply chain. This paper analyses the evolutionary stable strategy of three parties, including the governments, banks and enterprises, by establishing an Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Model, assuming that the governments take rewards and punishments policy both for banks and enterprises. The results show that whichever strategy the government chooses, there is always one party choosing non-implementation of the green credit or non-adoption of green supply chain strategy. From a shortterm perspective, whichever strategy the government chooses, the banks and enterprises will select the strategy of non-implementation and non-adoption respectively. From the long-term perspective, the banks and enterprises will take the initiative to choose implementation and adoption actively in the absence of the governmentg regulation.