考虑营销努力和创新能力的制造商激励供应商创新决策研究

The decision-making of manufacturer stimulating supplier innovation considering marketing effort and innovation capability

本文研究了一个由供应商负责提升关键零部件性能的创新,制造商负责产品制造与销售的供应链运作系统,考虑当营销努力水平和产品创新程度同时影响需求时,制造商激励供应商创新的决策行为.基于激励方式的不同,构建了三种激励决策模型,探讨不同情形下创新效应和营销努力效应对供应链成员决策影响的互动机制.研究结果表明:产品创新效应是制造商激励供应商创新的内在推动机制,营销努力效应在一定程度上推动了创新活动的发展;产品创新效应和营销努力效应对供应链成员决策和利润有积极的影响;创新效应和营销努力效应联合作用下,基于质量批发价格契约制造商可以获得较高的利润,但此时供应商创新水平较低甚至低于批发价格契约情形,继而文章进一步引入了成本分担契约,并论证了成本分担契约能够使制造商获得最优收益,同时有效地激励供应商创新.

This paper investigates the impact of different contracts on incentives and profits in a two-stage supply chain in which supplier is responsible for the innovation of key components while the manu[acturer takes responsibility for the product manufacturing and selling. When the demand is influenced by tile manufacturer＇s marketing effort and supplier＇s innovation level, tile influence of the interaction mechanism of innovation effect and marketing effect on players＇ decision-making is analyzed. The results show that： tile potential for innovation effect leads to manufacturer stimulating supplier innovation inore positively while the marketing effect plays an important role in innovation activities; the innovation effect and marketing effect have positive influence on the players＇ profits and decisions; under the combined effect of innovation and marketing, although the manufacturer gets a higher profits using the quMity-based wholesale price contract, the innovation level of supplier is low even less than the wholesale price case; furthermore, this paper introduces a cost-sharing contract, and it shows that the manufacturer can get the optimal profit, at the same time, effectively incentive the supplier innovation.