考虑消费者策略行为的产品服务供应链动态定价与协调

Dynamic pricing and coordination of product service supply chain considering strategic consumer behavior

针对一个制造商和一个服务集成商组成的产品服务供应链,考虑消费者向服务集成商购买产品服务系统时存在策略性等待行为,通过构建两个销售阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了产品服务系统价值、成本和服务价值占比等因素对消费者策略行为和均衡结果的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的绩效偏差,基于两阶段收益共享契约实现了供应链协调.研究表明:提高产品服务系统价值、服务价值占比能减少消费者策略行为,提高供应链及其成员的总利润;高产品服务系统价值、高服务价值占比虽能增加分散式决策下的系统利润,但也扩大了与集中式决策下的系统利润差距;收益共享契约能调整消费者的策略行为,即当服务价值占比较高时,可以通过价格调整来抑制消费者的策略行为实现供应链协调.

In a product service supply chain （PSSC） consisting of a manufacturer and a service integrator, consumers＇ strategic waiting behavior is considered when they purchase a product-service system （PSS） from the service integrator. By building a two-period dynamic game model, how the strategic consumer behavior and equilibrium results are affected by the valuation of the PSS, cost and proportion of service valuation （accounts for the valuation of PSS） is analyzed. Moreover, performance under the decentralized decision is compared with that under the centralized decision and a two-period revenue sharing contract is proposed to achieve the supply chain coordination. The following results are obtained： the improvement of the valuation of PSS and the proportion of service valuation can reduce the strategic consumer behavior, and thus improve profits of both PSSC and two parties; high valuation of PSS and high proportion of service valuation can not only increase the supply chain＇s profit under the decentralized decision, but also broaden the gap between the supply chain＇s profit under the decentralized decision and that under tilecentralized decision; the revenue sharing contract can adjust strategic consumer behavior. That is, when the proportion of service valuation is high, the adjustment of price can restrain the strategic consumer behavior, and thus achieve the supply chain coordination.