基于库存错放的供应链RFID投资均衡策略

Equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in the supply chain with inventory misplacement

本文以单制造商和双寡头竞争零售商组成的分散决策供应链为研究对象,基于零售商是否投资无线射频识别(radio frequency identification,RFID)技术,分别构建了链上成员不投资RFID(N情景)、零售商1投资RFID(L情景),零售商2投资RFID(F情景),及链上成员均投资RFID(T情景)的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解并探讨链上成员RFID的投资均衡策略.研究发现:零售商获得的批发价与其是否投资RFID相关,与其竞争者RFID投资策略无关.相较于N情景,F情景对零售商1的收益产生"负外部性";当RFID成本较低时,L情景对零售商2的收益产生"正外部性".当RFID成本较低时,供应链的均衡策略为T情景;当RFID成本较高时,供应链的均衡策略为L或F情景取决于零售商的错放率大小.

This paper studies a two-stage decentralized supply chain that consists of a monopoly manu- facturer and two oligopoly retailers. We accordingly set up the players＇ profit models under four scenarios： none of the players adopts RFID （Scenario N）, only Retailer 1 adopts RFID （Scenario L）, only Retailer 2 adopts RFID （Scenario F）, and all players adopt RFID （Scenario T）. We obtain the players＇ optimal decision-variables and revenues. Furthermore, we discuss the equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in competitive retailers＇ supply chain. We find that the retailer＇s wholesale price is related to whether invests in RFID or not, meanwhile, it is unrelated to the competitor＇s RFID investment strategy. Compared to the Scenario N, it causes Retailer 2 to have positive externality in Scenarios L when the RFID cost is low, however, it causes Retailer 1 to have negative externality in Scenarios F. When the RFID cost is low, Scenario T is the equilibrium strategy for the supply chain. When the RFID cost is higher, the equilibrium strategy for the supply chain is L or F, depending on the retailers＇ misplaced rates.