消费者低碳偏好下零售商主导供应链减排合作与协调

Cooperation on carbon emission reduction in a retailer-led supply chain with consumer's low-carbon preference

针对零售商主导供应链在碳交易和消费者低碳偏好下的减排合作决策问题,以供应商不减排投资分散决策模型为基础,建立了供应商减排投资的斯坦伯格博弈和垂直纳什博弈不合作模型及集中决策合作博弈模型.给出了供应商减排投资和选择垂直纳什博弈的条件,分析了零售价、减排量、需求和供应链成员利润的变化.研究发现,供应商投资减排,供应商和零售商的利润均增加且供应商利润在垂直纳什博弈均衡时比斯坦伯格博弈均衡时大,但斯坦伯格博弈和垂直纳什博弈均不能实现低碳供应链协调;特定条件下的垂直纳什博弈和集中决策的零售价格低于供应商不进行减排投资下的普通产品零售价格,即低碳并不一定高价.指出零售商具有选择与供应商进行投资减排合作的动力,从而构建了供应商和零售商共同决策批发价格的纳什讨价还价博弈模型来实现供应链减排合作与利润分配.最后,通过算例对模型进行了验证分析.

For the carbon emission reduction cooperation decisions in a retailer-led supply chain with the consideration of consumer＇s preference for low-carbon products and cap-and-trade policy, decentralized decision-making in Stackelber~ game and vertical Nash game and centralized decision-making models with supplier＇s investment in emission reduction were proposed based on the Stackelberg decentralized decision- making model without supplier＇s investment. Conditions about carbon emission reduction investment and game selection were obtained and changes in retail price, emission reductions, market demand and profits of the supply chain members were examined. It shows that carbon emission reduction by the supplier＇s investment increases the profits of both the supplier and the retailer, and the supplier＇s profit in Nash game is higher than that in Stackelberg game. However, neither Stackelberg game nor vertical Nash game can achieve the coordination of low-carbon supply chain. The retail price of low-carbon products lower than that of ordinary product can be achieved under certain conditions, that is, low carbon products do not indicate high prices. Retailer has driving force to cooperate with supplier to reduce emissions. So, a Nash bargaining game where the wholesale price was decided cooperatively by the supplier and the retailer, was developed to realize carbon emission reduction cooperation and allocate the supply chain profit. Finally, the models were validated by numerical example.