道德——解决家族企业治理X非效率问题的良方

Morality: Effective Prescription of X-inefficiency of Governance Mechanism in Family Firms

X效率理论为家族企业治理提供了个体分析视角,从而为家族企业治理低效率提供了配置性效率之外的解释。家族企业治理X非效率基于委托代理理论的解读揭示了X非效率的根本原因——委托代理双方人际信任的缺失。在中国家族企业中制度信任无法弥补人际信任的缺失,而道德却能实现代理方道德自律与道德激励所产生的高水平努力和委托方基于代理方高道德水平所产生的信任之间的"礼物交换",从而发挥其得天独厚之优势促进中国本土人际信任的发展,使委托代理双方形成以道德为基础的信任—绩效良性互动循环,进而优化委托代理双方差序格局下的博弈解,并促进家族企业治理效率的提升。具体而言,道德以扬弃的姿态延伸为超越血亲关系的家文化泛化形式,通过促进资本激活与融合、多层面积极施压和对正式契约的弥补与超越来形成道德文化、道德资本、道德激励和道德理性,进而改善X非效率,产生超常规效率。

The X-efficiency theory provides an individual perspective to interpret the inefficiency of the governance in family firms in some broad sense focusing on ＂non-allocative efficiency＂. The interpretation of X-inefficiency based on principal-agent theory reveals that the basic reason of X-inefficiency is the lack of interpersonal trust between the principal and agent. In Chinese family firms the institutional trust is unable to make up for the absence of interpersonal trust, However, the morality enjoys advantaged superiority in realizing the gift exchange in which agent is guided and energized by morality that will reciprocate to principal＇s trust based on agent＇s high moral level by providing higher effort level. This will improve the interpersonal trust and the quality of the solution to the game theoretic problem between principal and agent in the pattern of difference sequence whereby the efficiency of the governance in Chinese family firms will bc promoted. SpccificaUy, morality sublates and surpasses the kinship, it can also realize the extension of the family culture of family firms. In the form of moral culture, moral capital, moral incentive and moral reason the moral governance gives birth to hypernormal efficiency in family firms through the activation and combination of capital, the eustrcss from multiple perspectives and the supplement to the formal institution.