水环境严重破坏流域的生态补偿策略研究

The Eco-Compensation Tactics of Basin with Seriously Disrupted Water Environment

针对水环境已经遭到严重破坏的一类流域的生态补偿问题,通过建立3种情形下的演化博弈模型,递进地分析这类流域的生态补偿策略。研究发现:建立没有流域政府参与的演化博弈模型,证明了流域上下游在生态补偿问题上的演化稳定策略是(不修复,不补偿),该策略显然是无法达到生态修复目标的;引入上级政府参与生态修复,依然无法得到上下游间的理想演化稳定策略(修复,补偿);假设上级政府既承担生态修复成本又制定约束机制规范上下游的行为,当上游选择"修复"获得的自身收益增加和政府补贴大于其生态修复成本,且下游支付的补偿金额小于政府对其惩罚金额时,则上下游的演化稳定策略为(修复,补偿)。此结果证明:在市场交易模式尚不成熟的当前,由流域政府和下游共同承担的生态补偿模式必将成为水环境严重破坏流域的理想补偿模式。

Evolutionary game models under three conditions are structured for the basin whose water environment has been disrupted seriously.The three evolutionary game models have analyzed the eco-compensation tactics of this kind of basin progressively.Some findings have been caught.Firstly,the evolutionary stable strategy(for short ESS)without upper government's participation is(no restoration and no compensation).Obviously,the ESS cannot reach the goal of ecological restoration.Secondly,upper government's participation is brought into the evolutionary game model.However,the ideal ESS(restoration and compensation)cannot be ideally reached too.Thirdly,the precondition is that upper government undertakes the cost of ecological restoration and the task to enact constraint mechanism to regulate the behavior of upstream and downstream.From the third model,a conclusion has been obtained.When the economic benefits and government's subsidy outnumber the cost of ecological restoration,the upstream will choose restoration.When the fine outnumbers the cost for compensation,the downstream will choose restoration too.And the ESS is restoration and compensation in this case.It is evident that the eco-compensation pattern with the participation of both upper government and downstream will be testified to be the ideal pattern for the basin with seriously disrupted water environment.