契约参照点、高管才能与高管薪酬——来自中国情景下行业属性和产权性质的经验证据

Contract Reference Point,Executive Talent and Executive Compensation——Empirical Evidence from Industry Attibutes and Property Rights Under Situation of China

采用Demerjian等的DEA-TOBIT两阶段模型来估算高管才能,从行业属性和产权性质角度分析了契约参照点、高管才能与高管薪酬之间的关系,并使用2008-2013年我国上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验。分析结果显示:(1)高管才能越高,其薪酬水平越高;(2)高管薪酬契约中存在参照点效应,而国有企业和被保护行业更可能利用契约参照点来提升高管薪酬水平;(3)高管薪酬契约参照点效应中存在着高管才能高低的差异,拥有高才能高管的国有企业和被保护行业利用契约参照点拉动高管薪酬增长的倾向更明显。

Based on the estimation of executive talent by DEA-TOBIT two stage model(Demerjian et al.,2012;2013),this paper,from the perspective of industry attributes and property rights,analyzes the relationship between contract reference point,the executive talent and executive compensation with the help of Chinese listed companies' data from 2008 to 2013.The result shows that firstly,the higher the executive's talent,the higher the executive's compensation;secondly,a clear reference point effect exists in executive compensation contract,while state-owned enterprises or protected industries are more likely to use the reference point effect to stimulate the growth of executive compensation;finally,there are some differences of the reference point effect of executive compensation contract between high and low level of executive talent.It is much more obvious that state-owned enterprises and protected industries with high-talented executives use contract reference points to push forward the increase of executive compensation.