业绩承诺制度能否解决大股东利益输送问题?——基于2008-2015年定增并购事件的实证研究

Does performance compensation commitment solve interest transfer under big shareholder participation?——Empirical study based on private placement and acquisitions from 2008 to 2015

基于2008至2015年的290个定增并购事件,针对业绩承诺制度能否有效解决大股东参与下的利益输送问题,结合倾向得分匹配(PSM)和双重差分(DID)方法进行实证检验,结果显示业绩承诺产生的信号效应下短期利益输送未得到完全解决,但其产生的激励效应下长期利益输送程度有所改善,且股份补偿方式对大股东参与的定增并购效果更好。研究结果说明业绩承诺制度有待进一步改善,而股份补偿方式的业绩承诺在大股东参与的定增并购中值得推广。

Based on 290 cases of private placement and acquisitions from 2008 to 2015, PSM（Propensity Score Matching） combined with DID（Difference In Difference） method was utilized to test the validity of performance compensation commitment to solve the interest transfer problem especially under big shareholder participation. Result shows that under the signal effect, per- formance compensation commitment fails to soNe short run tunneling, but such commitment helps improve long run interest transfer through the long-term incentive effect, especially the stock compensation when big shareholder participates. This result can provide policy advice to improve performance compensation commitment and further extend the usage of stock compensation under big shareholder participation.