基于利益相关者理论的我国基金管理公司治理研究

Research of the Governance of Chinese Fund Management Companies On the Stakeholder Theory

在我国契约制的基金制度运作下,基金管理公司、公司股东和基金投资者作为利益相关者,必然存在着冲突。本文试图通过股权结构、董事会特征等变量研究基金管理公司治理效率问题。我们的研究表明更高的国有背景股东比例、更大的董事会的规模和更高的独立董事比例能提高基金管理公司董事会的效率,然而更大的股权集中度和投资决策委员会的规模则会损害董事会的效率。上市公司作为控股股东、外资股东持股、女性作为CEO或董事会成员以及监事会的规模对董事会的效率没有任何影响。

Under the operation of the contractual fund system in China, the inevitable conflict exists in the stakeholders, fund Management Company, shareholders of the fund management company and fund investors. This paper attempts to study the governance efficiency of fund management companies through the variables of ownership structure and board characteristics. Our results shows that increasing shareholding from state-owned financial companies, larger board and independent directors all enhance board effectiveness, whereas increasing the level of shareholder concentration and the size of the Investment Committee harm board performance. We also find that the presence of a listed company being a controlling shareholder, foreign shareholder, a female being CEO or a member of the board have no governance impact.