基于供应链协调的存货质押融资质押率研究

Research on Loan-to-value Ratio in Inventory Pledge Financing Based on Supply Chain Coordination

将供应链协调背景下的产品订购行为引入银行质押率决策。考虑上游核心企业(制造商)和下游中小企业(销售商)构成的二级供应链,制造商提供的批发价格和产品回购契约协调供应链。销售商以从制造商采购的全部产品向银行申请存货质押融资贷款,银行采用下侧风险控制技术控制信贷风险。研究表明,当银行满足信贷风险控制条件和期望利润最大化条件时,银行的最优质押率为分别满足两项条件所对应的质押率中的较小者;另外,如果信贷风险控制条件或期望利润最大化条件发挥作用时对应的产品数量低于供应链系统最优订购产品数量,银行的质押率与制造商的回购行为正相关;反之,则与制造商的回购行为负相关。

In this paper, we introduced the product order behavior into the loan-to-value ratio decision of the bank in the context of supply chain coordination. To that purpose, we examined the two-echelon supply chain formed by an upstream core enterprise(manufacturer)and a downstream small-and-medium-sized enterprise(seller), where the manufacturer offered the wholesale price and the supply chain was coordinated with a product buyback contract.The seller would apply for the inventory pledged financing loan from a bank with all the products it purchased from the manufacturer, and the bank would use downside risk control technique over the credit risks of the loan. The research showed that when the credit risk control conditions and the expected profit maximization conditions of the bank were met, the optimal loanto-value ratio was the lesser of the pledges that respectively satisfied the two conditions. In addition, if when at the credit risk control condition or the expected profit maximization condition the corresponding product quantity was less than the optimal ordering quantity of the supply chain system, the loan-to-value ratio of the bank was positively correlated with the buyback behavior of the manufacturer; otherwise,it was negatively correlated with it.