国有股权参股对民营企业过度投资的治理效应

Governance Effect of the Participation of State-Owned Equity on Overinvestment of Private Enterprises

本文以正在推行的混合所有制改革为背景,通过分析国有股权参股对民营企业过度投资的影响,探讨如何发挥国有股权对民营企业过度投资的治理效应。结果表明:第一大股东控制权私利的存在是导致民营企业过度投资的原因之一,其控制权私利与企业过度投资正相关;第一大股东持股比例与企业出现过度投资的可能性负相关。国有股权参股比例与民营企业过度投资呈倒U型关系,只有当参股比例大于监督的成本效果阈值时,国有股对民营企业第一大股东的监督才能缓解民营企业的过度投资。因此,不是所有的民营企业都适合参与"混改",国有股权参股民营企业的比例应设在合理区间,最重要的是控制权的融合,要避免政府过多地干预民营企业,只有在不改变双方原本目标的前提下才能达到彼此利用对方的资源优势互惠共赢。

Based on the implementation of the mixed ownership reform, this paper analyzes the impact of state-owned equity participation on overinvestment of private enterprises, and explores how to play the governance effect of state- owned equity on overinvestment of private enterprises. The results show that： the existence of the largest shareholders＇ controlling private interests is one of the reasons leading to overinvestment of private enterprises, and the private interest of its control is positively related to the overinvestment of the enterprise; the largest shareholder＇s share proportion is neg- atively related to the possibility of overinvestment. The proportion of state-owned equity participation also has a reverse U -shaped relationship with private enterprises＇ overinvestment. Only when the proportion of participation is greater than the cost threshold of supervision, the supervision of state-owned shares to the largest shareholder of private enterprises can alleviate the over investment of private enterprises. Therefore, not all private enterprises are suitable for participation in ＂mixed ownership reform＂, the proportion of state-owned shares participating in private enterprises should be in a reasonable range. The most important thing is the integration of control rights. We should avoid the government＇s excessive intervention in private enterprises. Only by changing the original goals of both parties, can we achieve mutual benefits and win each other＇s resources.