委托代理理论视角的CFO背景特征与公司绩效——基于中国家族控股上市公司的经验研究

CFO Background Characteristics and Corporate Performance from the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory:An Empirical Study based on Family-controlled Listed Companies in China

家族上市公司CFO选择对内部委托代理问题和企业财务绩效影响重大,本文在委托代理理论框架下,以2007-2013年中国A股民营上市公司为研究样本,对家族控股民营上市公司CFO的背景特征和公司绩效关系展开分析。结果表明:民营上市公司实际控制人控制权和现金流权相对分离程度越高,越倾向于选择内部来源的CFO;无论是内部来源还是外部来源CFO对财务绩效和超额销售管理费用的影响没有显著差异,但实际控制人的经营参与能够显著提升CFO对公司绩效的积极影响;CFO性别特征对公司超额销售管理费用有显著影响,外部来源女性CFO能够减轻公司内部的委托代理问题。本文可能的启示在于:民营企业CFO的委托代理问题与CFO的来源背景并无实质影响,而与CFO的个人特质有关。

The choice of CFO in family-controlled listed companies significantly contributes to internal principal-agent problem and corporate financial performance. This paper selects family-controlled A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as samples to conduct empirical analysis of CFO background characteristics and corporate performance within the framework of principal-agent theory. Results show that the actual controllers of family-controlled listed companies are more likely to choose CFO from internal source based on higher degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights; CFO from whether internal or external sources, has no significant difference in financial performance and excess sales management expenses, but the actual controller＇s participation can significantly improve CFO＇s positive impact on company performance; gender attributes of CFO put a significant impact on excess sales charges, and female CFO from external source can ease the principal-agent problem. The inspiration of this paper is that the principal agent problem of the private enterprise CFO has no substantial influence on the source background of CFO, but is related to the personal characteristics of the CFO.