CEO权力、媒体关注与企业过度投资

CEO Power, Media Coverage and Over-investment of Enterprises

通过选取2011年至2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据为样本,研究了上市公司CEO权力、媒体关注对企业过度投资问题的影响,并进一步考察了上述影响关系在不同制度环境下的差异。研究发现,公司CEO权力越大,上市公司过度投资的行为越严重;而媒体关注能够降低公司CEO权力—过度投资的敏感性。即,媒体关注能够有效抑制公司CEO权力引发的过度投资;在其他条件一定的情况下,相比于制度环境"差"的地区,制度环境"好"的地区媒体关注抑制公司CEO权力引发的过度投资效果更加显著。该研究对于完善公司治理结构、扩展媒体关注治理作用、加强制度环境建设,最终提高公司的投资效率,具有重要的理论和现实意义。

On the basis of 2011-2015 Chinese A-share fisted companies, this article examined the CEO power influence on enterprise over-investment problem, examined the CEO power and media coverage influence on enterprise over-investment problem, and examined how media influence CEO power and the relationship between the enterprises excessive investment, finally, further investigated the relationship between the above differences under the different institutional environment. The study found that CEO, the greater the power, the more serious the excessive investment behavior of listed companies; media attention can reduce the sensitivity of CEO power - excessive investment, that is, the media attention can effectively restrain the CEO power caused by excessive investment; other conditions in certain cases, the ＂bad＂ region compared to the system environment, system environment of ＂good＂ in the media focus on inhibiting the CEO power caused by excessive investment effect is more significant. The study to improve the governance structure and the investment efficiency of listed companies, expand the media focus on governance and institutional environment construction, is of important theoretical and realistic significance.