鱼乐、真知与浑沌——濠梁之辩的逻辑分析

Happy Fish, True Knowing and Chaos

对于庄子与惠施在濠梁之上的"鱼之乐"的辩论,本文试图论证:庄子并无意图要证明他知道知鱼之乐,他的目的在否证"他者心灵的不可理解/通接性"这一惠子的假定。本文认为庄子的"知"与他的"为一"观念是密切相关的,而庄子的"为一"观念与惠子的"一体"观念是截然不同的,二者不可混为一谈。此外,本文还对庄子的实在观进行了讨论。

Some interpreters think that Zhuangzi＇s （庄子） argument in his debate with Hui Shi （惠施） on the happiness of a fish is slippery; some other think that Zhuangzi provided a convincing argument of self-refuting to reject Hui Shi＇s view and thus to prove that he does know the happiness of a fish. In this article, I want to demonstrate that Zhuangzi＇s idea is not slippery. He has no intention to argue for his knowing the happiness of a fish. Instead, Zhuangzi＇s argument is aiming at the deconstruction of the thesis of the inaccessibility of other minds which is presupposed in Hui Shi＇s view. In addition, I think, through the debate, Zhuangzi is trying to go beyond the epis- temic approach in the sense that his idea of＂knowing＂ as a special kind of mental state is essentially different from that of ＂knowing＂ in terms of cognition. This idea is closely related to his ideas of＂wei-yi＂ （为一）, ＂hun-dun＂ （浑沌） ＂nothing＂ （无） and ＂dao＂. Moreover, in this article, I want to criticize Graham＇s view about his assimilation of Zhuangzi＇s ＂wei-yi＂ to Hui Shi＇s ＂yi-ti＂ （一体） and to demonstrate that Zhuangzi＇ s vision of wei-yi is entertained by one who has zhen-zhi （真知 true knowing） which cannot be appreciated by Hui Shi＇s epistemic approach. Finally, I would like to demonstrate that Zhuangzi＇s idea of reality is not a corre- spondence base of our conceptual schemes, a very idea criticized by Davidson. I would also like to demonstrate that Zhuangzi＇s idea is related to a kind of aesthetic, rather than ontological mysticism.