地区经济发展与高管薪酬契约

Regional Economic Development and Executive Compensation Contract

本文利用中国沪深A股上市公司2004—2012年数据探讨了地区经济发展水平对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究结果表明,在私有产权企业中经济发展水平越好的地区,业绩对高管薪酬水平的影响更为显著,薪酬业绩敏感性更强,而在国有产权企业中由于薪酬管制、政治晋升激励等因素,基于业绩的薪酬激励有效性并没有因为地区经济发展而显著改善。进一步研究表明,地区经济发展水平对私有企业薪酬业绩敏感性的改善主要存在于企业业绩上升时,即增加了私有企业业绩上升时高管薪酬的业绩敏感性,而对业绩下降时的敏感性没有显著影响,表明高管薪酬绩效黏性问题没有因为地区经济的发展而得到改善。研究结论反映了我国当前薪酬契约在不同产权性质企业中有效性的差异以及地区经济发展对薪酬契约有效性的改善效应,研究为我国企业高管薪酬契约的签订与执行特别是政府监管提供了经验证据的支持。

This paper selects China Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listing Corporation in 2004--2012 as sample and studies the effect that the level of regional development exert on executive compensation. The research shows that in the private companies, when the regional economic develops well, the impact of performance on the level of executive compensation is more significant, and the pay performance sensitivity is stronger. Due to the compensation regulation and stimulation of promotion, compensation incentive effectiveness based on the performance is not significantly improved by regional economic development in the state owned enterprise. Further research shows that the effect of regional economic development on the compensation sensitivity is only found when the performance is improved. This shows that the problem of enterprise compensation Sticky is not improved because of the development of regional economy. The conclusions of the study shows the difference of compensation contract effectiveness in state owned and private companies, and the improvement effect of regional economic development on the effectiveness of the compensation contract. The study provides empirical evidence for the signing and implementation of the executive compensation contracts and the government regulation.