无意识:一个现象学精神病理学的悖论难题

Unconscious:a Paradox of Phenomenological Psychopathology

无意识是精神分析的基本临床概念,由于其独有的理论特色,诸多现象学家试图对其合理性进行辩护或提出质疑。结果表明,无意识概念在哲学现象学中是无法直接自洽的。现象学精神病理学的发展为精神分析和现象学的沟通提供了契机,由于现象精神病学家对精神病的现象学反思是基于具体的临床分析经验而非抽象的先天逻辑结构,其对现象学的期待也停留在形式上的借鉴和启发上,而从未试图越界以某个现象学概念去直接取代无意识概念的临床地位,因此只有当精神分析和现象学被共同置于精神病理学的框架中,才有可能打破二者之间的天然隔阂。通过将对无意识概念的科学性反思转变为无意识在临床中的合理性问题,现象学精神病理学能够找到突破无意识困境的可能性。

The unconscious is a basic clinical concept of psychoanalysis. On the account of the theoretical feature of unconscious, many phenomenologists attempt to make a justification or query to its rationality. The result has shown that the concept of unconscious cannot be self-consistent directly in the philosophical phenomenology. The development of phenomenological psychopathology has of- feted an opportunity to the communication between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Since the phenomenological reflection about psychosis is based on the concrete clinical analytical experience rather than abstract transcendental logical structure, the expectation of phenomenological psychiatrists has remained on its formal enlightenment, but never attempt to use certain phenomenological concept to substitute for the unconscious in the sense of clinical position directly. Consequently, only by means of placing the psychoanalysis and the phenomenology in the frame of psychopathology can we break the congenital estrangement lays between them. Via transforming the scientific reflection about unconscious to its reasonable problem in the clinic, the phenomenological psychopathology can find a possibil- ity to break through the predicament of unconscious.