摘要
柏拉图在《蒂迈欧》中区分出除宇宙与宇宙的理念之外的"第三种东西",是宇宙万物"在之中"生成并且"从之中"消失的东西。关于它究竟是质料还是空间的争论由来已久。事实上,它既不能是亚里士多德式的质料,也不能是"原初质料",也不能是静态的、空的空间或者个别事物占据的"地方",而是一种"潜能/力量"(■)。此外,它作为宇宙的第二本原,可以回溯到柏拉图哲学中的总的第二本原——"不定的二"上去,是它在可感世界中的表现形式。
Plato distinguishes a u third kind” besides the universe and the forrm of the universe in himheus.The third kthing,uin which” all the sensible things come into being and ufrom which” they vanish. The problem, whether it is matter orspace,has always caused controversy. In fact,it can neither be the Aristotelian matter nor the ‘‘prime matter” nor the still,empty space nor the place occupied by individual things. Rather,it is a kind of “ ” (potenthe second principle of the universe, the third kind can be reduced actually to the general second principle in the whole Platonic philosophy-the uindefinite dyad”. It is its manifestation in the sensible world.
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2018年第1期28-35,共8页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition