认知科学视域中的康德伦理学

Kantian Ethics from the Perspective of Cognitive Science

康德伦理学的基本形而上学与元伦理学预设是"应然"与"实然"的区分,而一种基于认知科学与演化论视野的新伦理学研究,则以淡化这种二元对立为前提。从认知科学的角度看,倘若康德关于道德自治性的断言是正确的,我们就应当可以发现人类大脑具有一个同时满足如下所有特征的"道德模块"或"道德算法":(甲)它负责社会交往活动而不负责其他任务(如对于物理对象的知觉或思考纯理论问题);(乙)其运作特征必须被划归为"理性"而不是"感性"或者"直觉";(丙)其道德输出具有明显的"利他性"而不包含"工具性"或者"自利性"。然而,通过对于康德伦理学与认知科学研究中的几大主流思潮(如"通用问题求解器"假设、"大规模模块论"假设,等等)的比对却发现:上述这种对于"道德模块"或"道德算法"的假设,很难得到认知科学的各种主流见解的支持。

In Kantian ethics,the relationship between basic metaphysics and the presumptions of meta-ethics is the distinction between "ought to be"and "is."The study of a new kind of ethics based on cognitive science and evolutionary theory is grounded in the weakening of this binary opposition.From the point of view of cognitive science,if Kant's assertion about moral autonomy is correct,we should be able see in the human brain a"moral module"or"moral algorithm"that satisfies all the following conditions simultaneously:(a)being responsible for social intercourse rather than other tasks(such as the perception of physical objects or reflection on purely theoretical questions);(b)possessing operational characteristics that are"rational"rather than "emotional"or "intuitive";and(c)possessing an ethical output that is clearly "altruistic"and free of "instrumentality"or "selfinterest."However,comparative research on Kantian ethics and several major trends in cognitive research(such as the hypotheses of the "general problem solver"and"massive modular theory,")indicates that there is little support for the existence of a"moral module"or"moral algorithm"from mainstream trends in cognitive science.