作为“道德命令”的“应然判断”:外部区分与内部澄清

The Ought-Statement as the Moral-Prescriptive:Both Internal and External Clarifications

在常用的表达当中,"‘是’与‘应当’"或"‘事实判断’与‘应然判断’"的关系问题常常被等同于"休谟问题",而后者是道德哲学以及与政治哲学探讨密切相关的一个核心的问题;但这两个问题之间显然并不能直接等同,因为"应然判断"并不直接等同于"道德命令"。以康德、理查德·黑尔以及马修·克里斯曼、巴勃罗·吉拉贝特和劳拉·瓦伦蒂尼等人的相关阐述为基础,可以厘清与"应然判断"和"道德命令"相关的两个向度的区分:一个是"应然判断"的内部区分,同时也是相对于"道德命令"而言的外部的区分,即作为"道德命令"的应然判断与"非道德命令"的应然判断的区分,后者包括"指向非道德性目的的行为命令"与"对可能性事实的推断";另一个是道德命令内部的区分,包括"终极性的普遍规范"与"运用规范所得出的具体的行为规则"的区分以及"终极性的普遍性规范"内部的"评价性的理想原则"与"规定性的原则"之间的区分。明确这两个不同向度的区分是回答包括"休谟问题"以及"事实判断与广义的道德命令"关联性在内的"‘事实判断’与‘应然判断’"两者之间的关系问题的必要前提。

In the related discussion,the question on the relationship between Is and Ought or IsStatement and Ought-Statement is usually considered as identical to the Is-Ought problem raised by D.Hume,an essential problem of both moral and political philosophy,but these two questions are not idential because of the difference between the Ought-Statement and the Moral Prescriptive referred to by Hume.Based on the statements of I.Kant,R.Hare,M.Chrisman and P.Glabert etc.,the prese-nt paper attempts to discriminate between the Ought-Statement and the Moral Ought-Statement in the following two dimensions：the first is to discriminate between the Moral Ought-Statement and the non-Moral Ought-Statement that constitute the Ought-Statement with the non-Moral Ought-Statement containing the non-Moral Prescriptive and Inferential Statement;the second is to discriminate between the Ultimate moral prescriptive and the Secondary moral prescriptive that constitute the Moral Ought-Statement with the Ultimate moral prescriptive containing the evaluative prescriptive and the practical prescriptive.To clarify these discriminations is prerequisite for answering the question of the relationship between Is-Statement and Ought-Statement that contains the well-known problem raised by Hume.