零售商店内服务对制造商渠道选择的影响

The Effects of In-store Service on Manufacture Launching Direct Channel

文章运用Stackelberg博弈和Nash博弈建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,分析了在不同市场背景下零售商服务成本高低对制造商选择不同渠道的影响,并得到不同渠道下的最优利润。研究发现,当零售商的服务成本较高时,制造商选择开通直销渠道有利于增加利润;否则,制造商将不开通直销渠道,以避免双渠道冲突所带来的利润损失。此外,当零售商店内服务成本较低时,零售商倾向于获得与制造商相同的地位和市场权威;反之,则仅作为制造商的追随者。

With the rapid development of China＇s e-commerce , manufacturers in the preser^^ation of traditional retail channels at the same time, opened a network of direct sales channels. This paper studies the effects of in-store ser^^ice on the choice of the manufa-cture launching online direct channel. In the symmetric-infor^nation framework, the in-store service Stackelberg and Nash models are proposed between single-channel and dual-channel supply chains. The optimal pricing, in-store ser^^ice and profits are compared bet-ween single-channel and dual-channel supply chains of Stackelberg （Nash） competition. It shows that if the cost of in-store ser^^ice is high, manufacturers decide to launch online direct channels in order to increase profits, otherwise, the manufacturer decline to launch online direct channel to reduce channel conflict. In addition, if the cost of in-store ser^^ice is low , the retailer is willing to be under the Nash game framework, otherwise, the retailer just acts as a Stackelberg follower.