应得与资格

Desert and Entitlement

在当代分配正义理论中,唯一能够对平等正义观构成重要批判和挑战的当属应得正义观。平等主义者拒斥应得,其路径有两条:一条是罗尔斯式的平等主义者采取的方式,以资格代替应得,拒斥应得在"制度中"的作用;另一条是诺奇克式的权利平等主义者采用的路径,同样以资格代替应得,拒斥应得在"前制度中"的作用。就理论性质来说,资格无法取代应得。资格的基础在于制度和规则,应得的基础在于主体行动。当制度体现应得时,资格与应得相统一,应得的理论效应隐而不显;当制度背离应得时,资格与应得相分离,应得的批判效用鲜明有力。在分配正义语境下,应得具有自身的独特作用。

Among contemporary theories of distributive justice, the only conception of justice that can challenge egalitarianism is desert. Egalitarianists defy desert by two approaches： one by Rawlsian egalitarian perspective where desert is replaced by entitlement and thus its role in institutions is refused; the other one by the Nozickian rights-based egalitarianism where desert is also replaced by entitlement, and its role in ＂ preinstitution＂ is refused, too. Theoretically, entitlement cannot take the place of desert. The foundation of entitlement lies in institutions and rules, while desert has its basis in behaviors of the agents. When desert is embodied by institutions, entitlement and desert are united, making desert implicit; when desert is in discordance with entitlement, desert is bearing a powerful force of critique. In the context of distributive justice, desert qualifies as an independent concept.