经理管理防御对金融资产分类会计政策选择的影响研究——基于两权分离度的调节作用

A Study of the Influence of Managerial Entrenchment on the Selection of Accounting Policies for the Classification of Financial Assets——Based on the Moderating Effect of the Separation of Two Rights

上市公司终极控制权的结构差异体现出控股股东不同的行为动机,进而影响管理防御动机驱使下经理人的金融资产分类会计政策选择。将第一、第二类代理问题相结合,以2007-2016年沪深两市所有A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,实证分析经理管理防御对金融资产分类会计政策选择的影响及两权分离度对二者关系的作用机理。研究发现,在制造业上市公司中,经理管理防御程度越高,越倾向于将金融资产划分为可供出售金融资产。进一步研究发现,两权分离度会加剧管理防御动机对可供出售金融资产划分倾向的正向影响,体现出终极股东的"利益侵占效应";而终极控制权、现金流权对二者关系具有负向调节作用,体现出积极的治理效应。

The structural differences of ultimate control rights of listed companies reflect the different behavior motives of controlling shareholders,and then affect the managers' selection of accounting policies for the classification of financial assets driven by managerial entrenchment motivation. Combining the first with the second type of agency problems and taking all A-share listed manufacturers in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during the period of 2007-2016 as samples,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of Managerial Entrenchment on the selection of accounting policies for the classification of financial assets and the influencing mechanism of the separation of two rights on the relationship between the two parties. Research finds that in listed companies of manufacturing industry,the higher the level of management entrenchment,the more likely to classify financial assets into those available for sale.Further research finds that the separation of two rights would strenghthen the moderating effect of the managerial entrenchment on the amount of financial assets available for sale,which reflects the interests occupation effect of ultimate shareholders; And both the ultimate control rights and cash flow rights play a negative regulatory role in the relationship between the two parties,which reflects the positive governance effect.