内部控制、产权性质与费用粘性——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

Internal Control,Ownership Nature and Cost Stickiness——An Empirical Research Based on the Listed Companies in China

代理问题是费用存在"粘性"的重要原因之一,而良好的内部控制是缓解代理问题的重要机制,那么高质量的内部控制能否抑制费用粘性呢?本文以2012~2016年我国A股制造业上市公司为样本进行实证检验,发现高质量的内部控制能够抑制费用粘性。不同产权性质的企业费用粘性程度不同,内部控制对费用粘性的抑制作用也存在差异。具体而言,相对于非国有控股企业,国有控股企业费用粘性更大,内部控制对费用粘性的抑制作用在国有控股企业更为显著。

Agency problem is one of the important reasons for cost stickiness,and a good internal control is an important mechanism to alleviate the agency problem.Can high quality internal control suppress cost stickiness? Based on Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as the research sample,this paper examines the influence of internal control quality on cost stickiness and conducts empirical analysis.Our research shows that internal control of high quality can help to alleviate the cost stickiness.At the same time,we find that the level of cost stickiness differs in enterprises with different ownership nature,and the effect of internal control quality in reducing cost stickiness is also different.Specifically,compared with the non-state-owned enterprises,the cost stickiness of state-owned enterprises is more serious and the effect of internal control quality on the cost stickiness is more significant.