上市公司担保圈现象的形成机理——基于企业间关系视角的研究

The Formation of Guarantee Circle of Listed Firms:Evidence from the Perspective of Inter-firm Relation

本文从企业间关系的视角探讨上市公司担保圈现象的形成机理,研究结果表明,企业间熟知关系是构建担保圈的基础,企业本身对熟知关系的依赖度越高,加入担保圈的可能性越大;从异质性的角度看,当公司绩效越差或者治理水平越低时,企业间熟知关系与加入担保圈的正向关联越小;政府干预也会削弱企业间熟知关系与加入担保圈的正向关联;企业间熟知关系能够有效缓解加入担保圈带来的机会主义行为和对绩效的负面冲击。研究发现,较差的治理水平以及制度环境,导致企业在信用担保中更少地考虑企业间熟知关系,扭曲了信用担保本有的功能,进而导致担保圈问题频发。

This paper surveys the formation of guarantee circle fi＇om the perspective of inter-tim1 relationship. Results show that inter-firm familiarity is the basis of the guarantee circle. The greater familiarity is the firm, the more probability is a firm in the guarantee circle. Furthermore, when a firm＇s performance is lower or governance is worse, the positive relation between familiarity and guarantee circle is less. Government intervention can mitigate the positive relation between familiarity and guarantee circle. These results indicate that bad governance and institutional background can make firms consider less of familiarity in the guarantee contract, which distorts the function of guarantee and leads to guarantee circle problem. This paper has implications for commercial banks＇ guarantee loan practices as well as enhancing the credit resource allocation efficiency in new normal period.