上市公司并购重组与内幕交易行为研究

A Study on M&A,Reorganization and Insider Trading of Listed Companies

本文以2009~2014年我国上市公司并购重组事件为样本,研究了并购重组过程中的内幕交易存在性及其影响因素。结果显示,公司并购重组过程中,普遍存在信息提前泄露与内幕交易问题,股票价格和交易量在并购重组公告前后发生明显的异常波动。进一步研究发现,预期内幕交易的收益越高、并购重组交易金额越大,内幕交易越严重;公司在并购重组信息披露前停牌越早、证监会对内幕交易的稽查执法力度越大,越有助于抑制内幕交易行为。此外,本文研究结果主要存在于并购重组成功的子样本中,而对于并购重组失败的样本,知情人进行内幕交易的动机较弱。本文的研究结论对资本市场内幕交易监管实务具有一定的实践指导意义。

Based on mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） of listed companies in China from 2009 to 2014, this paper investigates whether insider trading exists in the process of M＆A as well as its occurrence mechanism. We find that the stock price and trading volume have begun to increase significantly before the announcement day of M＆A, which implies that insider trading is pervasive in the process of M＆A. Further studies show that the higher expected return after announcement of M＆A, and the greater the amount of M＆A transaction, the more insider trading. The earlier a company begins to suspend trading before information disclosure, and the stricter enforcement of insider trading by China Securities Regulatory Commission, the less occurrence of insider trading. In addition, our results mainly exist in the subsample of successful M＆A, while the informed insider has weaker incentive to insider trading in the failed M＆A. The conclusions of this paper have important implications for the supervision of insider trading.