摘要
以农民和食品企业组成的二级绿色食品供应链为研究对象,考虑绿色食品质量和绿色食品声誉对供应链收益的影响,运用微分博弈的方法从动态上分析了三种不同博弈情形下,农民和食品企业的最优策略和利润。同时,考虑政府补贴和绿色食品认证对绿色食品供应链的影响,比较了有无补贴和绿色食品认证下绿色食品质量和供应链主体利润。结果表明:当农民和食品企业的收益分配系数满足一定条件时,绿色食品质量、农民和企业的利润、供应链总利润从Nash博弈到Stackelberg博弈再到主体合作下的博弈,均实现了帕累托改进。政府补贴和绿色食品认证对提高绿色食品质量和供应链利润起到积极作用,并通过算例仿真验证了以上结论。
Taking the two-echelon supply chain of green food consisting of farmer and food company as the research object, based on the impact of green food quality and reputation, this paper dynamically studies the farmer and food company's opti- mal strategy and revenue under three different game situations by differential game. Meanwhile, taking into account the im- pact of government subsidies and green food certification for green food supply chain, green food quality and profits of the supply chain are compared under the availability of subsidies and green food certification. Results show that:when income distribution coefficient of farmer and food company meets the certain condition, quality of green food, revenue of farmer and food company and the total profits of supply chain achieved a Pareto improvement from Nash game to Stackelberg game and to cooperation game. Government subsidies and green food certification play a positive role to improve green food quality and supply chain's profits, and the above conclusions are verified by simulation.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期130-135,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71433006、71373117)
江苏高校哲学社会科学重点项目(2017ZDIXM062)
南京财经大学校内课题(KYC201620)
南京财经大学青年学者支持计划
关键词
绿色食品
微分博弈
政府补贴
绿色食品认证
供应链协调
green food
differential game
government subsidies
green food certification
supply chain coordination