卖空约束放松与银行信贷决策

Deregulation on Short Selling Constraints and Bank Loan Decision

本文以中国资本市场2010年开始实施的融资融券制度作为切入点,采用双重差分模型系统地检验了卖空约束放松对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现,卖空约束放松之后,银行倾向于向标的公司发放更大额度的信贷,同时其贷款期限更长,而且贷款担保要求更为宽松。进一步研究发现,上述关系在标的公司信息风险和信用风险较大以及银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下更为显著。最后,我们还发现,卖空约束放松之后,更多贷款给标的公司的银行其经营绩效随之明显上升。综上,卖空约束的放松大大缓解了标的公司的信用风险和信息风险,而银行也做出了合宜的信贷决策调整,最终导致银行经营绩效的提升,这表明卖空机制具有积极的改善银行信贷决策的溢出效应。

Short selling system implemented in 2010 is market. This paper studies this arrangement＇s spillover We find that the implementation of short selling system an important institutional innovation in Chinese capital effect from perspective of banks by using DID design. motivates banks to provide loans with higher amounts, longer maturities and lower likelihood of being secured. Further analysis indicates that the above relations are more significant when banks are concerned about borrowers＇ information risk and credit risk or borrowers＇ information risk and credit risk is high. And banks＇ performance significantly increases after their borrowers＇ stocks are in the list of the program. The above findings mean that short selling has spillover effect on banks＇ loan decision. In other words, short selling reduces borrowers＇ credit risk and information risk and banks also correspondingly make appropriate adjustment to their loan decision.