基于演化博弈的基础设施建设PPP模式稳定性分析

Stability analysis of PPP mode in infrastructure construction based on evolutionary game theory

基础设施建设引入PPP模式是解决资金不足问题的重要手段,为分析PPP模式在基础设施建设过程中的参与情况,本文构建以政府、企业和公众消费者为主体的演化博弈模型,并引入演化仿生模型对博弈结果进行数学推导。运用Matlab对系统进行数值仿真,结果显示:PPP模式最终将在系统中生存下来;其扩散受到政府、企业和公众消费者的综合影响;政府的税收优惠应遵循适度原则;政府三种措施对企业激励程度由大到小排序为税收优惠、政策立法、成立机构。研究结论对基础设施建设资金缺口的解决,以及利益相关者的策略选择有一定参考价值。

Introducing PPP mode in infrastructure construction is a significant method to resolve fund shortage. To analyze the participation of PPP mode in infrastructure construction, an evolutionary game model was first construc- ted, which took government, enterprise, and public consumers as the main body. The evolutionary bionic model was introduced to compute the game results, and Matlab was adopted to conduct assignment and simulation for the system. The results show that the PPP model will ultimately survive in the system ; the diffusion of the PPP mode is influenced by the local government, enterprise, and public consumers; and the tax preference of the government should follow the principle of moderation. Furthermore, the effects （from large to small） of the three incentive measures of the government on an enterprise are as follows： tax preference, policy legislation, and establishment of institution. The conclusions have reference values for solving the fund shortage and assisting the strategic choice of stakeholders in infrastructure construction.