机构投资者增持、高管激励与亏损公司未来业绩

Study on the Relationship of Institutional Investors Increased Holdings,Executive Incentives and the Loss Company's Future Performance

笔者选取沪深两市2003—2014年亏损上市公司作为研究样本,探究不同类型的机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的影响差异,以及高管激励对不同类型机构投资者增持股票影响亏损公司未来业绩产生的调节效应。研究发现,压力抵制型机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的正面影响比压力敏感型机构投资者增持股票更强;相对于压力抵制型机构投资者增持股票而言,高管激励会更加明显地减弱压力敏感型机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的正面影响。在此基础上,提出正确识别不同类型机构投资者增持股票动机、建立合理的高管激励体系、增强高管激励信息的透明度等政策建议。

This paper selects 2003 to 2014 a total of 12 years for all the loss listed companies as the research sample, using linear regression model to research the relationship of different types of institutional investors increased holdings, executive incentives and the loss company＇s future performance. The study finds that the pos ance of the itive impact of the pressure-resisting institutional investors increased holdings on the future performloss-making companies is stronger than that of the pressure-sensitive institutional investors in- creased holdings. Relative to the pressure to resist institutional investors increased holdings, the level of executive incentives will significantly reduce the positive impact of pressure-sensitive institutional investors increased holdings on the future performance of the loss listed companies. And we further propose to identify the motivations of different types of institutional investors to increase their holdings, to establish a reasonable in- centive system and improve the transparency of information on incentive policies .