摘要
地方政府竞争围绕争夺资源展开,主要表现为税收竞争、规制竞争与工业用地逐底竞争。一方面,央地公共财政支出结构失衡加剧了对财政与税收资源的攫取动力;另一方面,官员人事管理"标尺竞争"的体制安排诱发了地方官员的双重博弈,二者共同构成了地方政府竞争的内在机理,也埋下了无序竞争的隐患。通过中央与地方财政收支制度化、预算监督约束地方政府财政支出、矫正地方官员政绩考核策略行为等手段,可以实现对地方政府竞争的有效规制。
In order to obtain resources, the local government competition is performed as the tax competition, regulatory competition and industrial land competition. On the one hand, the structural imbalance between the central and local governments in the public finance expenditure has exacerbated the impetus of obtaining the financial and tax resources. On the other hand, the institutional arrangement of the personnel competition management has led to the double game of local officials. These two aspects together constitute the internal mechanism of the local government competition, but also planted the risk of disorderly competition. It iS possible to realize the effective regulation of local government competition through the institutionalization of central and local fiSCal revenue and expenditure, budget supervision restricting local government financial expenditure, and correcting the performance evaluation strategy of local officials.
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期32-37,共6页
Reform of Economic System
关键词
地方政府竞争
运行机理
规制途径
local government competition
operational mechanism
regulatory approach