环境规制中地方规制部门与排污企业的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Local Regulatory Department and Pollutant Enterprises in Environmental Regulation

根据环境规制中地方规制部门与排污企业的互动关系,采用演化博弈理论工具,构建了地方规制部门与排污企业的博弈模型,分别研究了未引入地方政府干扰和中央环保部门约束以及引入干扰和约束的博弈方决策演化规律及其影响因素。研究结果表明:在未引入干扰和约束的情况下,地方规制部门和排污企业的决策演化规律有9种情形,环境绩效考核系数不会影响博弈双方的策略选择;提高环境规制标准、提高污染物削减量、降低治污成本会促进企业治污;提高环境规制标准、降低环境执法成本,会促进地方规制部门严格执法;企业污染物产生量越大,地方规制部门执法越严格,而污染物削减量的增加将不利于地方规制部门严格执法。引入干扰和约束后发生的变化:地方规制部门和排污企业的决策演化规律增加至12种情形;污染物削减量对地方规制部门的决策影响变得不明确;提高环境绩效考核系数、减少地方政府对环境执法的干扰、提高环境失职的处罚力度,可以促进地方规制部门严格执法。

According to the interaction between local regulatory department and pollutant enterprises in environmental regulation, the game model was established based on the evolutionary game theory. The strategic law and its influencing factors were studied with and without interference and constraint from local government and central environmental department. Results show that the strategic law includes 9 situations without interference and constraint, and the strategic choice will not be affected by environmental performance coefficient. The pollution control of enterprise will be promoted by enhancing environmental standard, increasing pollution reduction, and reducing pollution abatement cost. The regulation implementation will be promoted by enhancing environmental standard, reducing implementation cost, increasing pollution output, and reducing pollution reduction. There are 12 situations of strategic law in the condition of interference and constraint, and the influence of pollution reduction on regulatory department strategy became ambiguous. The regulation implementation will be promoted by increasing environmental performance coefficient, reducing interference of local government, and enhancing punishment of environmental delinquent in the condition of interference and constraint.