政府补贴、市场进入与企业盈利——兼评政府补贴的技术效应与反竞争效应

Government Subsidy, Market Entry and Enterprise Profits: Technical Effect and Anticompetitive Effect of Government Subsidy

基于联立方程模型研究了政府补贴、市场进入与企业盈利之间的相互作用关系,并在此基础上考察了政府补贴可能会产生的技术效应和反竞争效应。研究发现,由于"扶贫"式补贴和"逐补"式进入的影响,政府补贴在多数情况下恶化了在位企业的盈利绩效,进而陷入了"越亏越补,越补越亏"的恶性循环。即使高强度的政府补贴能够在一定程度上改善在位企业的盈利水平,但这主要是由于高行政壁垒限制了潜在企业市场进入,并非技术进步所致。在几乎所有补贴强度下,高行政壁垒和对象选择的歧视性都使得政府补贴具有较强的反竞争效应,技术效应始终没有得到发挥。

Based on a simultaneous equation model, this article analyses the relationship among the government subsidy, market entry and enterprise profits. And on this basis, it examines the technical effect and anticompetitive effect that may be brought forward by government subsidy. The findings indicate that due. to the influence of the ＂poverty relief＇ subsidy and the ＂door-to-door subsidy＂ entry, in most cases the government subsidy has worsened the profit performance of the incumbent enterprises, which are caught in the vicious circle of ＂more lose more subsidy, more subsidy more lose＂ . Even if the profits of the incumbent enterprises can be improved by the high-intensive government subsidy, it mainly attributes to the high administrative barriers？limiting the market entry of the potential enterprises, not to the technical progress. Under almost all the subsidy strength, the higher administrative entry barriers and discriminatory choice of the subsidy objects make govern- ment subsidy have a relatively strong antieompetitive effect, thus the technical effect has never been given a full play.