管理层股权激励方式选择与风险承担——基于内生性视角的研究

Choice of Managerial Equity Incentive Methods and Risk Taking:From the Endogenous Perspective

以2006—2013年间实施股权激励的公司为样本,采用Heckman方法,以逆米尔兹比率计量管理层风险偏好,分析管理层风险偏好、股权激励与风险承担三者之间作用关系。研究结果发现,管理层风险偏好与公司风险显著相关,即风险偏好的管理层更倾向于股票期权激励,风险厌恶的管理层则倾向于限制性股票激励;在控制管理层风险偏好变量情况下,股票期权激励仍然具有风险激励效应,而限制性股票则没有风险激励效应。进一步分析不同产权性质的公司实施不同股权激励方式的激励效应,表明在实施股票期权公司中,国有企业风险激励效应弱于民营企业,在实施限制性股票公司中,二者没有显著差异。

Taking the companies which bring equity incentive into force during the period of 2006-2013 as samples, this paper adopts the Heckman method to measure the management risk prefer- ences with the inverse Milz ratio; then it analyzes the relationship among management risk preference, equity incentive, and risk taking. The results show that the management risk preference is significantly correlated with corporate risks, that is, the management with risk preference is more inclined to take stock option incentive, while the management with risk aversion tends to restrict stock incentive. In the case of the management risk preference variables being controlled, the stock option incentive still has risk incentive effect, while the restricted stock has no risk incentive effect. Then this paper fur- ther analyzes the incentive effects of different equity incentives in companies with different property fights. The results show that in the companies implementing stock options, the risk incentive effect of state-owned enterprises is weaker than that of private enterprises, while in the companies implementing restrictive stocks, there is no significant difference between the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.