摘要
舍勒把"阻力"视为"实在性",认为阻力是意志的体现,是比认知关系更根本的存在关系。海德格尔也从"实在性"问题域入手,批评"阻力思想"虽然突破了传统存在论的限度,但还没有真正思入本源性的"人与存在之关联"。舍勒在回应中批评海氏受限于一种"此在的唯我论",没有真正理解"阻力思想"的丰富可能性。这种争辩实质上是对"如何克服传统存在论"的争辩。但由于相互理解乃至自身理解的困难,这最终只是构成了一次"错位的交锋",对此间情形和缘由的分析可以使我们更加真切地观察海氏与舍勒的思想史位置,并由此更为深刻地理解思想对话的困难与出路。
Scheler thinks of "resistance "as "reality "and is convinced that resistance as ontic relation is more fundamental than the epistemological relation. Heidegger believes that although Scheler 's thought breaks through the limitations of traditional ontology,the original relation between human and Being is not yet thought. Scheler,however,critically argues that Heidegger is limited by Dasein's solipsism and that he does not really understand the substantial possibility of resistance. The argument concerned with "resistance"is essentially an argument about how to overcome traditional ontology. Analyzing this situation can help us observe the positions of Heidegger and Scheler in the history of thought.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期106-115,128,共10页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社科基金"海德格尔对德国古典哲学的整体评判研究"(编号14XZX014)的阶段性成果