CEO离职与公司继任决策研究:基于董事会结构特征的实证分析

Consequence of CEO turnover and the company's succession decision:An empirical analysis based on the features of board structure

CEO的能力和管理水平直接影响企业股票价值变动,而由于某种原因引致的CEO离职行为及公司的继任决策更是股票收益变动重要影响因素。继任决策一般由企业董事会提出并决定,所以,董事会结构对继任类型的选择有很大影响,研究发现外部董事比重和权力特征是影响CEO继任选择的关键因素。本文分析我国2000-2014年上市公司年报数据之后发现:CEO离职之后,公司的外部继任决策成为最优决策;外部董事的比重与外部继任CEO概率之间存在正向关联性,且外部继任CEO的概率随着外部董事比重的增加而呈现单调递增趋势;CEO的"自愿"和"强制"离职两种情况下,外部董事比重与外部继任概率之间都是单调递增的关系;从继任信息公布后的企业平均股票收益情况来看,企业股东会从外部继任决策中获益,而内部继任时企业股东利益会受到损害;企业规模越小,外部继任决策效用越高,而企业规制性程度越高,外部继任决策效用越低。

The ability and management level of CEO directly affect the company＇ s stock value. However, the turnover behavior of CEO and the company＇ s succession decision are important factors that affect the stock returns. In the company, the succession decisions are made and implemented by the board. So the board structure has a great influence on succession decisions. The researches reveal that the proportion of external directors and the characteristics of power are key factors affecting succession choice. Based on the analysis about the annual report data of Listed Corporation （2000 -2014 ）, the paper found tile following five points ： firstly, the external succession decision is the optimal decision for company after the current CEO is turn off. Second- ly, the COiTelation between the probability of external succession and the proportion of external directors is positive, and also the external succession probability would be increased with the proportion of external director＇ s monotony. Thirdly, whenever the CEO was forced resignation, or was Voluntary resignation, the correlation between the probability of external succession and the proportion of external directors is always positive. Fourthly, from the point of view on average return, the shareholders would benefit from the external succession, but damage from interior succession. Lastly, the smaller of the enterprise size, the higher performance of the external succession, but the higher degree of corporate regulation, the lower performance of the external succession.