地区环境规制政策为何趋异?——来自省际贸易成本的新解释

Why is Regional Environmental Regulation Policies Different? A New Explanation for the Inter-regional Trade Cost

本文通过引入企业异质性假设并构建一个区域环境规制的空间经济学理论模型,考察了在"为增长而竞争"的制度背景下省际贸易成本降低对区域环境规制力度差异的影响,并基于1998~2013年中国"省份-省份"地区组面板数据进行了实证检验。研究发现:(1)在现行体制下,发达地区与欠发达地区之间必然会存在显著的环境规制政策差异;(2)随着地区间贸易成本逐渐减低,发达地区会采取更为严格的环境保护政策,欠发达地区则会采取更为宽松的环境保护政策,地区间的环境规制政策差异会扩大;(3)环境规制竞争政策存在着显著的俱乐部效应。要改变这一困局,则要从根本上改变以增长竞争为核心的官员考核体系,并加快推进环境保护系统的垂直化管理。

By introducing regional environmental regulation policy,this article builds a theoretical model of heterogeneous firms' location choice,and investigates how the opening of regional trade will affect the gap of regional environmental regulation intensity under the incentive target of"competition for growth",and also empirically tests the result by using 1998-2013 panel data of Chinese provincial"group pairs".It finds that:Under the existing official's selection system,the regional non-cooperation of environmental regulation policy is stable equilibrium,and the gap of regional environmental regulation intensity will inevitably exist;with the opening of regional trade,the gap of regional environmental regulation intensity will grow bigger,and in turn it will cause more environmental pollution;there is remarkable club effect in regional environmental regulation competition policy.Therefore,in order to get out of the dilemma,we should change the evaluation system of official tournament which aims at competition for growth.